all the Entente nations whose discouragement might precipitate serious peace movements among one or more of them. And once the rot sets in it might be difficult to stop it. No doubt the weight of America would be felt in 19185 but the danger is that we may not get there, unless active operations are presented and a continuance of military success buoys up the spirit of the nations to fight on till America can come in as a decisive factor. I feel the danger of a purely defensive policy so gravely that I would make the following suggestions in case the French carry out such a policy. In that case we should make them take back a substantial part of their line now occupied by us. As they would require no great reserve for offensive purposes, they would be in a position to do so. Our forces should then be concentrated towards the north, and part should go to the rear as a strategic reserve, while the rest should endeavour to recover the northern coast of Belgium and drive the enemy from Zeebrugge *Flanders* and Ostend. This task will be most *offensive urged* formidable, especially if both the Russian and French lines remain passive, and every pressure should be exerted to induce them to be as aggressive as possible, even if they cannot actually assume the offensive.

But, however difficult the task, something will have to be done to continue our offensive, and I see more advantages in an offensive intended to recover the Belgian coast and deprive the enemy of two advanced submarine bases, than in the present offensive, which in proportion as it succeeds in driving the enemy out of France will make the French less eager to continue the struggle beyond